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ABSTRACT
Given the continued growth in the globalization of production, working
conditions in global supply chains have come under increased scrutiny.
Although there has been much debate about corporate codes of conduct
and monitoring procedures, the question of how buyers inﬂuence their
suppliers’ working conditions at the factory level remains poorly
understood. Using a unique data set based on monitoring by the
International Labour Organization (ILO) and original survey data
collected in Cambodia’s garment sector, this study shows that the main
channel linking buyers and supplier compliance performance is the nature
of their relationships. Market-based relationships mediated through
sourcing agents are systematically associated with poorer compliance
performance. In particular, when a reputation-conscious buyer is sourcing
from a factory, it has a positive effect on compliance, and their presence
appears to condition relationship variables. Deterrence and learning
channels are not supported by the evidence. The ﬁndings signal the need to
pay more attention to the nature of buyer–supplier relationships if we seek
to improve labor standard compliance. Market-based relationships
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motivate neither buyers nor suppliers to invest their time and resources to
tackle the root causes of poor working conditions. Rather, the results here
indicate the need to develop collaborative relationships marked by open
dialogue, trust, and commitment, which in turn help to foster an
environment supportive of continuous improvement in working conditions.
INTRODUCTION
As production becomes increasingly globalized, working conditions and
labor rights in global supply chains have entered the spotlight and come
under increased scrutiny. In the absence of effective state regulation and
a global regulatory framework, working conditions in most developing
countries remain substandard. Faced with anti-sweatshop campaigns and
exposure of child labor and dismal working conditions in their supply
chains, many multinational enterprises (MNEs) have come to adopt codes
of conduct (CoC) and monitoring procedures (Elliott & Freeman, 2003).
To a large extent, therefore, non-state regulation has become one of the
dominant modes of regulating labor conditions in global supply chains.
The rise of non-state regulation has provoked heated debates about
the desirability and effectiveness of CoC and monitoring procedures
(Esbenshade, 2004; Jenkins, Pearson, & Seyfang, 2002; Nadvi & Waltring,
2004; Seidman, 2007). Nevertheless, the question of what determines
working conditions in supplier establishments and, in particular, how buyers
inﬂuence them remains poorly understood. Recognizing this gap, Locke,
Kochan, Romis, and Qin (2007a) call for a more comprehensive approach
to understanding and addressing the root causes of poor working conditions.
This paper contributes to reframing the debate by delving into how buyer–
supplier relationships inﬂuence supplier compliance performance.
The existing studies of buyer inﬂuence on supplier working conditions are
predominantly case studies of branded buyers (Frenkel, 2001; Frenkel &
Scott, 2002; Locke & Romis, 2006). They generally conclude that close and
collaborative relationships between brands and suppliers encourage learning
and value-sharing, contributing to better working conditions. Although
insightful, these case studies are based on only a handful of suppliers.
Addressing this weakness, Locke, Qin, and Brause (2007b) quantitatively
assess the determinants of supplier compliance-performance using Nike’s
compliance data covering 830 suppliers in 51 countries. They ﬁnd that
factories designated as Nike’s ‘‘strategic partners’’ and those frequently
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visited by Nike’s staff (both compliance and production) have higher
compliance scores. They see this as evidence that close buyer–supplier
relationships foster trust and encourage knowledge sharing, positively
inﬂuencing working conditions. Nonetheless, they assume rather than
demonstrate such channels of buyer inﬂuence, whereas their exclusive focus
on one global brand precludes generalization.
Recently, Jiang (2009) has found a statistically signiﬁcant link between the
nature of buyer–supplier relationships and supplier compliance with CoC,
based on survey data from China’s garment industry. Jiang shows that
buyer–supplier relationships characterized by open and two-way dialogue
are positively related to supplier compliance with CoC. The paper, however,
does not differentiate the types of buyers, which are likely to affect supplier
compliance-performance. Moreover, it does not consider other channels of
buyer inﬂuence such as deterrence and learning.
In an attempt to ﬁll this knowledge gap, Oka (2010) exploits unique
industry-wide panel data from Cambodia’s garment sector and shows that
factories supplying for reputation-conscious buyers – deﬁned according to
buyers’ membership status of multi-stakeholder initiatives – have better
labor standard compliance than factories without this factor. This effect
remains signiﬁcant after controlling for factory characteristics and using
different speciﬁcations. Nevertheless, data limitation prevented it from
delving into the black box of buyer inﬂuence, through which channels
buyers inﬂuence their supplier compliance-performance.
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is twofold: (i) to examine different
channels of buyer inﬂuence with regard to supplier compliance-performance
and (ii) to assess whether reputation-conscious buyers affect those channels
differently. To achieve this task, the paper exploits the International Labour
Organization (ILO) monitoring data and original survey data collected in
Cambodia’s garment sector. The paper proceeds as follows. The next section
begins with a short description of the ILO monitoring program in Cambodia’s
garment sector, which is followed by the theories and hypotheses. The sub-
sequent section discusses the data and methods, followed by estimation results.
The paper then concludes with overall observations and practical implications.
THE ILO MONITORING PROGRAM IN
CAMBODIA’S GARMENT SECTOR
Cambodia’s garment sector has been undergoing an innovative experi-
ment to improve working conditions. All exporting garment factories are
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required by the Cambodian government to submit to regular monitoring
by the ILO program called Better Factories Cambodia (BFC). In fact, this
ILO monitoring program grew out of the 1999 US–Cambodia bilateral
trade agreement, in which an increase in a quota (i.e., access to the US
market) was conditioned upon signiﬁcant improvements in working
conditions (Polaski, 2006). The ILO was asked to monitor and report
progress in the industry-wide labor compliance level, which was then used
by the US government to determine quota increases and subsequently by
buyers for sourcing decisions (Kolben, 2004). The Cambodian government
has come to see the ILO monitoring scheme as a niche strategy to attract
reputation-conscious buyers, whereas these buyers have come to appreciate
ILO monitoring as a stamp of approval. This explains why the ILO
monitoring program has been renewed even after the expiration of the quota
regime at the end of 2004.1
Compared to private monitoring often criticized for its ineffectiveness and
conﬂict of interests, monitoring by the ILO enjoys important advantages.
First, unlike audit ﬁrms dependent on factories they audit for revenues, ILO
monitors are not directly paid by monitored factories, which helps maintain
its impartiality.2 Second, unlike many commercial auditors detached from
local contexts and unable to speak directly to local stakeholders, ILO
monitors are locally hired Cambodian nationals who speak the language
and understand the local context, increasing their sensitivity and effective-
ness as monitors. Third, ILO monitors are hired through competitive
procedures, extensively trained, and well-equipped, helping ensure the
quality of monitoring.
The Cambodian case provides an excellent opportunity to further our
understanding about the role of buyers in inﬂuencing supplier working
conditions. Although the ILO is mandated to monitor and report factory
compliance with the Cambodian labor law and international labor
standards, the ILO has no enforcement power. The Ministry in charge of
labor inspection and remediation suffers from incapacity and corruption,
which prevents it from effectively enforcing the labor law. Consequently,
buyers often act as a virtual enforcement authority, demanding cor-
rective action from suppliers when important violations are found.
Furthermore, ILO-BFC has provided the author with the industry-wide
monitoring and other factory-level data as well as logistical support
to conduct a speciﬁc survey targeting garment factory managers. The
survey was critical to obtaining detailed information on how suppliers
interact with buyers.
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THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES
This section discusses the theories that link buyer variables and supplier
compliance-performance. Three potential channels of buyer inﬂuence are
examined: deterrence, relationship, and learning. Each of the three channels
generates three hypotheses that (a) the channel is directly linked to supplier
compliance-performance, (b) the channel mediates the effect of reputation-
conscious buyers on supplier compliance-performance, and (c) the
channel interacts with reputation-conscious buyers and inﬂuences supplier
compliance-performance.
Deterrence
In economic and legal studies, the traditional view of compliance behavior
has emphasized deterrence, assuming that rational and proﬁt maximizing
ﬁrms decide to comply with regulation only when the expected cost of non-
compliance exceeds the expected beneﬁt (Becker, 1968; Stigler, 1970). This
theory posits that a ﬁrm’s propensity to comply with regulations is positively
related to the probability of detection and the expected penalty of violation.
This deterrence theory has been applied to occupational safety and health
(Viscusi, 1979), minimum wage compliance (Ashenfelter & Smith, 1979),
and recently, to private monitoring of minimum wage in the US garment
industry (Weil, 2005; Weil & Mallo, 2007). They ﬁnd that more stringent
forms of monitoring by manufacturers are associated with better contractor
compliance with minimum wage regulations.
Regarding reputation-conscious buyers, the deterrence theory would
predict that those buyers who face a higher probability of detection and
expected penalties for poor working conditions in their supply chains are more
likely to rigorously regulate their suppliers than other buyers. Some buyers,
predominantly global brands, have been repeatedly exposed by the media and
criticized by labor activists. Moreover, the expected penalty is higher for those
buyers that derive much of their value from their brand image, which could be
easily damaged by sweatshop allegations (Conroy, 2007).
Detection Hypotheses
According to the deterrence theory, suppliers who are rigorously monitored
and credibly sanctioned by buyers are likely to expect a higher cost of
non-compliance, leading them to reduce non-compliance. The probability of
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detection is higher when buyers’ compliance staff visits supplier establish-
ments frequently.
Hypothesis 1a. The frequency of visits by buyers’ compliance staff is
negatively related to supplier non-compliance.
Reputation-conscious buyers may affect compliance performance of their
suppliers through factory visits in two ways. First, the frequency of visits
may be different. Given the higher stakes, reputation-conscious buyers may
visit their suppliers more often than other buyers, which may explain why
reputation-conscious buyers are associated with better supplier compliance-
performance.
Hypothesis 1b. The effect of reputation-conscious buyers on supplier
non-compliance is mediated by the frequency of visits.
Alternatively, the frequency of visits by reputation-conscious buyers
may not be different, but the impact of their visits may be different from
other buyers if the ‘‘quality’’ of their visits is higher. In this case, it is not the
frequency of compliance visits per se, but the interaction of visit frequency
and reputation-conscious buyers that inﬂuences supplier compliance-
performance.
Hypothesis 1c. The negative association between the frequency of visits
and non-compliance is more pronounced in the presence of reputation-
conscious buyers.
Warning Hypotheses
The other element in the deterrence theory is the expected penalty of non-
compliance. For suppliers, a potential penalty of non-compliance is a
cancellation of orders by buyers. When a buyer and a supplier sign a
contract, it normally includes a clause that obliges suppliers to abide by the
buyer’s CoC. Although it occurs only rarely, buyers have the right to
terminate the contract in the case of non-compliance. Hence, buyers who
want to rigorously enforce their CoC are likely to communicate the negative
consequence of non-compliance (i.e., cancellation of orders) by warning
their suppliers implicitly or explicitly. In turn, suppliers who receive such
warnings are likely to take compliance issues more seriously.
Hypothesis 2a. Warnings by buyers about the negative consequence of
non-compliance are negatively related to supplier non-compliance.
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As discussed earlier, reputation-conscious buyers with higher stakes in
regulating labor conditions in their supply chains may inﬂuence their
suppliers through warnings in two ways. First, they may be more likely to
issue warnings than other buyers, which may help reduce non-compliance.
Hypothesis 2b. The effect of reputation-conscious buyers on supplier
non-compliance is mediated by warnings.
Alternatively, it may not be whether or not a warning has been issued,
but rather who issues the warning that makes a difference for supplier
compliance-performance. When a reputation-conscious buyer issues a
warning, it may be taken more seriously by suppliers, given the higher
stakes involved.
Hypothesis 2c. The negative association between warnings and supplier
non-compliance is more pronounced in the presence of reputation-
conscious buyers.
Buyer–Supplier Relationships
The management literature on supplier behavior has focused on opportu-
nism and the nature of buyer–supplier relationships. The literature
principally draws on transaction cost economics (TCE) and relational
exchange theory (RET), which have been integrated in many studies
investigating buyer–supplier relationships and their impacts (Heide & John,
1992; Jiang, 2009; Morgan & Hunt, 1994).
Transaction Cost Economics
The TCE approach is based on the behavioral assumptions of bounded
rationality and opportunism (Williamson, 1985). Unlike the deterrence
theory that assumes perfectly rational individuals, TCE (and more broadly
new institutional economics) assumes that individuals are intendedly
rational but constrained by limited capacity to gather and process
information (Simon, 1957). Opportunism refers to a lack of honesty in
transaction, which can be active, such as lying, stealing, and cheating or
passive, including subtle forms of deceit such as withholding of information
(Williamson, 1985). More broadly, behaviors that are inconsistent with an
agreed contract or principle are considered opportunistic (Wathne & Heide,
2000). From the TCE perspective, therefore, non-compliance with agreed
CoC can be viewed as suppliers’ opportunistic behavior vis-a`-vis buyers.
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According to Williamson’s logic, the degree of opportunism largely
depends on asset speciﬁcity, in the sense of a non-transferable investment in
one’s partner. When a buyer invests time and resources in its supplier, this
investment cannot be redeployed elsewhere, and vice versa. A higher degree
of asset speciﬁcity required in transaction, then, raises switching costs and
induces commitment and reduces opportunism from the party that made
such investment. The early TCE literature emphasized vertical integration,
or hierarchy, as a solution to opportunism given its superior capacity to
monitor and align incentives than market (Williamson, 1975). Nonetheless,
over the past decades, new organizational forms that are neither market
nor hierarchy, or hybrids, have become more dominant (Williamson, 1991).
Under the hybrid form of governance, the cost of replacing a partner is
more expensive than market and thus parties work together to restrain
opportunism (Joshi & Stump, 1999). Opportunism is often controlled
through ‘‘learning by monitoring’’ characterized by collaboration and
information exchanges (Helper, MacDufﬁe, & Sabel, 2000).
Relational Exchange Theory
A legal theorist Macneil (1980)’s concept of relational contract, in which
social relations shaped by prevailing norms and values are embedded in
contracts, has been extensively applied to buyer–supplier relationships.
Unlike the TCE approach that sees each transaction as a unit of analysis,
the RET views the relationship based on the transactions as a unit of
analysis (Vandaele, Rangarajan, Gemmel, & Lievens, 2007). Although the
RET does not reject the existence of opportunism, it rejects the assumption
of universal opportunism (Hawkins, Wittman, & Beyerlein, 2008). Parties
to relational exchange depend on relational norms such as trust and
commitment broadly deﬁned as the mutual expectations that exchange
partners will act in mutually beneﬁcial ways. Hence, opportunistic behavior
in relational exchange is controlled through mutual and self-regulation
rather than threats or incentives (Gundlach, Achrol, & Mentzer, 1995).
Given their relative strengths, most scholars combine the TCE and RET to
explain buyer–supplier relationships and related performance. For instance,
Sako (1992) distinguishes two types of contracting relationships: arm’s-
length versus obligational contractual relations. Arm’s-length contracting is
a transaction-based relationship where tasks, duties, and conditions are
spelled out in explicit contracts. Obligation contracting, on the contrary, is a
trust-based relationship characterized by a high level of interdependence,
risk sharing, and long-term horizons. Each type of relationships involves a
trade-off. Although buyers pursuing the arm’s-length strategy may be able to
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obtain the lowest price by playing one supplier off against another, they
have more difﬁculty in inducing commitment and controlling opportunism.
In contrast, parties to the obligational contracting can reduce uncertainty
and opportunism through developing trust and frequent communication, but
they are locked in the relationship.
Empirical support for the importance of buyer–supplier relationships
in inﬂuencing supplier compliance performance is growing. Through a
matched-pair case study, Frenkel and Scott (2002) examine two otherwise
similar Adidas suppliers and explain the gap in working conditions by their
varying relationships with Adidas: one enjoyed a close relationship while
the other was kept at arm’s length. Jiang (2009) shows that norm-based
relationships characterized by open, two-way dialogue and joint problem
solving are positively associated with supplier compliance with CoC.
Long-Term Relationship Hypotheses
From the TCE perspective, long-term relationships tend to justify idiosyn-
cratic investment because parties have long enough horizons to reap the
beneﬁts of their investment. Also, repetitive interactions provide opportu-
nities to reward good behavior and punish opportunism. From the RET
viewpoint, the duration of relationships helps foster trust and align
ﬁrms expectations, reducing opportunistic behavior. Empirically, long-term
relationships are found to increase commitment and reduce opportunism in
inter-ﬁrm relationships (Joshi & Stump, 1999). Hence, the longer duration of
the relationship, especially with the most important buyer, is likely to reduce
supplier non-compliance.
Hypothesis 3a. The duration of the relationship with a supplier’s most
important buyer is negatively related to supplier non-compliance.
Reputation-conscious buyers seek to ensure that their supply chains are
constantly up to a high standard in terms of quality and compliance, which
requires a higher degree of asset speciﬁcity. Accordingly, reputation-con-
scious buyers are likely to prefer a long-term relationship to foster trust and
induce cooperation. This tendency may explain why suppliers of reputation-
conscious buyers are associated with better compliance-performance.
Hypothesis 3b. The effect of reputation-conscious buyers on supplier
non-compliance is mediated by the duration of the relationship with a
supplier’s most important buyer.
Although a long-term relationship may be necessary to induce better
compliance, it may not be sufﬁcient if it is conditioned upon the type of
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buyers: reputation-conscious buyers are more likely to make idiosyncratic
investment in their suppliers than other buyers. In other words, the duration
of the relationship may signiﬁcantly affect supplier compliance only when it
is with a reputation-conscious buyer.
Hypothesis 3c. The negative association between the duration of the
relationship and supplier non-compliance is more pronounced in the
presence of reputation-conscious buyers.
Market-Based Relationship Hypotheses
According to the TCE, market-based, arm’s-length relationships are
preferred when the degree of asset speciﬁcity required in transactions is
low because it is more efﬁcient to use the market to manage standardized
transactions than to make idiosyncratic investment in their partners.
Although efﬁciency may be attained in a market-based relationship, con-
trolling opportunism is more difﬁcult given the lower switching costs despite
safeguards such as threats and incentives. From the RET perspective, the
lack of relational norms in a market-based relationship precludes fostering
commitment and trust. In sum, both the TCE and RET predict a higher
degree of opportunism under market-based relationships.
In the global garment industry, three types of buyer–supplier relation-
ships exist. The ﬁrst type goes through sourcing agents, which match buyers
with factories around the world, searching for the best combination of price,
quality, and delivery demanded by buyers. Agents function as a ‘‘one-stop
shop’’ or a supply chain manager, and the relationship between a buyer and
a supplier factory is a contract-based one-off relationship (Play Fair, 2008).
The second type goes through vendors, which are MNEs with multiple
production facilities. Vendors tend to have long and established relation-
ships with buyers and distribute orders to their subsidiaries around the globe
as well as to sub-contractors. The third type is a direct relationship between
a buyer and a factory, which could occur when a factory or its head ofﬁce
enjoys a long and established relationship with its buyer. In sum, the ﬁrst
type represents a market-based relationship, which is likely to be associated
with worse compliance-performance.
Hypothesis 4a. Market-based relationships through agents are positively
related to supplier non-compliance.
On the contrary, reputation-conscious buyers who are demanding
about quality and compliance standards are likely to avoid market-based
relationships that do not encourage suppliers to commit to continuous
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improvement. In this case, reputation-conscious buyers are associated with
better supplier compliance-performance precisely because they avoid such
relationships.
Hypothesis 4b. The effect of reputation-conscious buyers on supplier
non-compliance is mediated by the absence of market-based relationships.
Alternatively, even when transacting through agents, reputation-con-
scious buyers may still make idiosyncratic investment and induce supplier
efforts in a way that other buyers do not. In this case, the negative effect
of market-based relationships is mitigated by the presence of reputation-
conscious buyers.
Hypothesis 4c. The positive association between market-based relation-
ships and supplier non-compliance is less pronounced in the presence of
reputation-conscious buyers.
Learning Hypotheses
The nature of buyer–supplier relationships also affects the degree of learning,
which inﬂuences working conditions in supplier establishments. Technical
assistance and knowledge spillovers from buyers signal buyers’ credible
commitment to the relationship, which then helps foster trust between buyers
and suppliers (Sako & Helper, 1998; Bo¨nte, 2008). While providing learning
opportunities does not necessarily provide protection against supplier
opportunism, it may help suppliers to improve production processes and
work organization, which may in turn improve working conditions.
Case studies have found that there is substantial scope for learning
between buyers and suppliers, which helps improve working conditions.
In a matched-pair case study, Locke and Romis (2006) illustrate how a
collaborative relationship between Nike and its supplier encouraged
upgrading of a production system and work organization, leading to higher
wage levels and shorter work hours. Speciﬁcally, the supplier that adopted a
lean-production system with the help of Nike beneﬁted from greater worker
participation and higher productivity. Hence, it can be hypothesized that
the more learning opportunities buyers provide, the better the supplier
compliance-performance.
Hypothesis 5a. Learning opportunities provided by buyers are negatively
related to supplier non-compliance.
Nonetheless, not all buyers provide similar learning opportunities. As the
case studies of global brands corroborate, brands tend to provide more
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extensive training and assistance to upgrade their supplier production
systems and to improve quality control than other buyers. Such asset
speciﬁc investment is justiﬁed by high quality and compliance standards
sought by reputation-conscious buyers. Therefore, reputation-conscious
buyers may provide more learning opportunities than others, helping reduce
supplier non-compliance.
Hypothesis 5b. The effect of reputation-conscious buyers on supplier
non-compliance is mediated by learning opportunities.
Alternatively, it may be the ‘‘quality’’ of learning rather than the quantity
of learning that affects supplier compliance performance. Reputation-
conscious buyers may provide ‘‘better’’ learning opportunities than other
buyers, given the higher standards required.
Hypothesis 5c. The negative association between learning opportunities
and supplier non-compliance is more pronounced in the presence of
reputation-conscious buyers.
DATA AND METHODS
This study exploits monitoring and ﬁrm characteristics data collected by
ILO-BFC. ILO monitors conduct un-announced visits of all the exporting
garment factories every 6 to 8 months on average. ILO monitoring covers
the entire population of exporting factories in Cambodia (approximately
300), and the data are systematically available since 2006. Nevertheless,
ILO-BFC does not collect detailed information on buyer–supplier relation-
ships, which is critical to testing the above hypotheses. For this reason, the
author conducted a survey of supplier factories in the Cambodian garment
industry in the latter half of 2008. Consequently, the size of the survey
determines the size of the sample.
Survey Data Collection
The survey was conducted between June and October 2008 in Phnom Penh,
Cambodia, and the survey targeted general managers of exporting garment
factories. A total of 51 factory managers responded to the survey out of
approximately 300 of Cambodia’s export garment factories.3 Although it
covers only 17 percent of the industry population, it does not indicate the
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response rate as explained below. Survey questions have been tested with
industry experts and then piloted in four factories. Given that factory
managers are predominantly Chinese speakers, the questionnaire and the
cover letter were written in both English and Chinese.
The survey collection employed a multi-pronged approach to increase
responses given limited time and resources. First, ILO monitors distributed
and collected questionnaires during their routine factory visits. Second, the
author accompanied ILO monitors and conducted face-to-face interviews
with factory managers during factory visits. Third, the author sent emails to
factory mangers asking to complete the questionnaire on-line. The three
survey vehicles were used equally: monitors collected 16 responses, the
author interviewed 17 factory managers, and the web-based survey collected
18 responses.
The major issue in survey is a problem of non-response, which introduces
bias and distorts the representativity of a sample. For this reason, Hansen
and Hurwitz (2004) propose combining interviews and mail questionnaires
to optimize the response rate given resource constraints. Indeed, interviews
helped alleviate non-response problems pervasive in self-completed survey
collection. When managers were present, which was almost always the
case, the interview approach attained a 100 percent response rate (i.e., all
managers agreed to be interviewed), whereas the response rate for the web-
based approach reached only 15.5 percent.4 As ILO monitoring schedule
is random (i.e., not affected by the level of compliance or any other
explanatory variables), interviewing during factory visits reduces potential
bias in the sample. Thanks to the multi-pronged survey collection approach,
the sample proﬁle is broadly in line with the population proﬁle as shown
in Table 1, although larger factories and better performers are slightly
over-represented.5
Table 1. The Population and Sample Proﬁle.
Non-Compliance Factory Size Factory Age Presence of
MSI Buyer
Population Sample Population Sample Population Sample Population Sample
Observation 300 52 300 53 300 54 300 52
Mean 20.0 17.8 1197.5 1420.3 5.4 5.9 0.4 0.4
SD 12.4 9.7 1056.7 1086.6 2.3 2.4 0.7 0.5
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Measures and Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable: Non-Compliance
ILO monitors assess nearly 400 checklist items of labor standards, which
are based on the Cambodian labor law and the international labor
standards. The monitored standards have been agreed by the Cambodian
government, employers, and unions in the garment industry. The checklist
items are grouped into the following categories: contracts, wages, hours,
leave, welfare, occupational safety and health (OSH), and fundamental
rights. As for monitoring procedures, un-announced visits span an entire
day or longer for larger establishments. The process includes an on-site
inspection, meetings with human resource managers, union leaders, and
shop stewards as well as off-site interviews with workers. Copies of pay
slips and hour records are collected for veriﬁcation. ILO monitors assess
each checklist item and determine whether a factory complies with a
speciﬁed standard. When the factory is deemed out of compliance with
a certain item, monitors make a standardized suggestion for improve-
ment. Therefore, the presence of a suggestion is equivalent to non-
compliance and the absence of a suggestion, compliance. In general, a
smaller number of suggestions or non-compliance items indicates better
working conditions.
The industry-average compliance level in 2008 was 90 percent (where
a score of 100 indicates full compliance), suggesting a very high level of
overall compliance in the Cambodian garment industry. In fact, giving equal
weight to each checklist item leads to over-representation of OSH and
welfare, as together they account for 35.7 percent of the total checklist
items.6 To rectify this over-representation, the weight of each OSH/welfare
item has been reduced to half, leading to a better balance of issue categories
in the composite: contract (15.4 percent), wage (24.6 percent), hours/
leave (19.7 percent), welfare/OSH (21.5 percent), and fundamental rights
(18.6 percent).7
Independent Variables
Independent variables can be loosely organized under the categories
articulated in the hypotheses section; namely, those of deterrence, buyer–
supplier relationships, learning, and reputation conscious buyers. Table 2
shows the survey responses regarding the channels of buyer inﬂuence.
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Table 2. Responses to the Questionnaire on the Channels of
Buyer Inﬂuence.
Percent Valid Missing
Deterrence
How many times does buyers’ compliance staff visit your
factory per year?
50 1
0–2 times 30
3–5 times 30
6–8 times 14
9–11 times 2
12–14 times 2
15 times or more 22
Your buyers have warned explicitly or implicitly about the risk
of non-compliance leading to a cancellation of orders
46 50 1
Relationship
For how many years have you produced for your most
important buyer?
50 1
0–2 years 14
3–4 years 28
5–6 years 26
7–8 years 10
9–10 years 6
10 years or more 16
Do you communicate directly with buyers or through vendors
or agents?
51 0
Mostly directly with buyers 43
Mostly through vendors 37
Mostly through agents 31
Learning
Your buyers share technical knowledge 51 0
Yes, often times 33
Yes, sometimes 53
No, not really 14
Your buyers have been involved in determining the production
system
26 51 0
Your buyers encourage training for workers/supervisors/
managers
50 1
Yes, often times 30
Yes, sometimes 50
No, not really 20
Channels of Buyer Inﬂuence and Labor Standard Compliance 167
Deterrence
One of the measures of deterrence is the frequency of visits by buyers’
compliance staff. As shown in Table 2, there is large variation: 60 percent of
factories receive up to 5 compliance visits per year while 22 percent receive
15 times or more. The frequency of visits is coded from 1 to 6 as an interval
measure. The other measure of deterrence is a dummy variable of whether
or not buyers have warned implicitly or explicitly about the consequence
of non-compliance (i.e., cancellation of orders). 46 percent of the managers
acknowledge having received implicit or explicit warnings.8
There is a potential issue of endogeneity with the deterrence variables if
buyers tend to visit problematic factories and issue warnings disproportio-
nately to these factories. Although endogeneity may be controlled by using
instrumental variables or ﬁrst-differencing variables, a lack of appropriate
instruments and temporal gaps between dependent and independent
variables precludes using these techniques. Nonetheless, potential endo-
geneity may be less problematic considering that buyer compliance visits
have multiple purposes unlike ILO monitoring. Locke et al. (2007b:18)
mention that Nike concentrates its resources on high-risk factories and
suppliers with which they want to develop more long-term relationships.
Similarly, the author’s interviews with buyer local representatives ﬁnd that
they visit their suppliers not just to enforce their CoC, but to develop open
and close relationships. Moreover, the problem of endogeneity for warnings
may be less severe since the author’s interviews have found that supplier
perception of warnings varies considerably. Some managers considered
accepting buyer CoC as equivalent to an implicit warning given the clause in
CoC stipulating that violation of CoC may lead to termination of contracts.
Other managers, however, considered warnings as speciﬁc buyer remarks
addressing particular compliance problems.
Buyer–Supplier Relationships
The nature of the buyer–supplier relationships is measured by the duration
of the relationship with a supplier’s most important buyer and the mode
of communication with buyers. The duration varies from 0–2 years
(14 percent) to 10 years or more (16 percent), whereas the majority falls
between 3 and 6 years (54 percent). The duration of the relationship is coded
from 1 to 6 as an interval measure. The mode of communication with buyers
is divided quite equally: directly with buyers (43 percent), through vendors
(37 percent), and through agents (31 percent). The measure of a market-
based relationship is a dummy variable of whether or not a supplier
communicates through agents.
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Learning
According to the surveyed managers, buyers share technical knowledge often
(33 percent) or sometimes (53 percent). The kind of knowledge commonly
shared is quality control (95 percent), followed by work place skills
(51 percent), and production system (40 percent). 26 percent of the surveyed
factories had buyers involved to determine their production systems. Buyers
encourage training often (30 percent) or sometimes (50 percent). In general,
there appears to be knowledge sharing between buyers and suppliers. From
these questionnaire responses, three dummy variables have been created to
measure learning opportunities: whether or not buyers often share technical
knowledge, whether or not buyers have been involved in determining
production systems, and whether or not buyers often encourage training.
Reputation-Conscious Buyers
The last independent variable is a reputation-conscious buyer, which may
be mediated by the other independent variables or interact with them to
inﬂuence compliance performance. To operationalize the concept of a
reputation-conscious buyer, this paper follows Oka (2010) and looks at
whether or not a buyer participates in multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSI).
Drawing on O’Rourke (2006, p. 899), this paper deﬁnes MSI in labor
regulation as a scheme that involves various stakeholders (not only companies
but also non-governmental organizations) in negotiating labor standards,
monitoring compliance with these standards, and establishing mechanisms to
encourage ﬁrms to comply with these standards. Since reputation-conscious
buyers tend to participate in MSI to show their commitment to better
working conditions and safeguard their reputation, it is a reasonable proxy.
Although MSI can take various forms from certiﬁcation of production
facilities, compliant-based investigation, to collaboration of buyers, this
study focuses on the Fair Labor Association (FLA) and the Ethical Trading
Initiative (ETI), given their prominence and buyer-oriented nature.9 Hence,
a dummy variable of a buyer participating in the FLA or the ETI (hereafter,
MSI buyers) is used as a measure of a reputation-conscious buyer.
Control Variables
The buyer-related variables are unlikely to be the only factors that
affect factory-level compliance. Various establishment-level characteristics
are clearly related to working conditions, and thus need to be controlled for.
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First, the size of the factory, as measured by number of employees, may
affect the level of labor standard compliance. Larger factories have made
larger investment, raising their opportunity costs of exit, which, in turn,
justiﬁes larger investment to comply with labor standards. In particular, when
achieving compliance requires large ﬁxed costs (e.g., setting up facilities,
buying equipments, training), a minimum efﬁciency scale may be required.
Moreover, given that size increases employee alienation and supervisory costs,
larger establishments are more likely to see the beneﬁt of respecting labor
standards to raise self-motivation and to minimize sources of disputes (Bryson,
Gomez, Kretschmer, & Willman, 2007). For all these reasons, larger establish-
ments are more likely to be associated with better compliance. The natural
logarithm of total number of employees measures the size of the factory.
Second, the age of the establishment is likely to inﬂuence the level of
compliance. Factories may learn the beneﬁt of compliance (or the cost of
non-compliance) and best practices through own experience (age). On the
contrary, age may impose physical constraints: older establishments tend to
have older facilities and limited space, making it more difﬁcult and costly to
comply with certain standards concerning welfare as well as safety and
health (Bryson et al., 2007). As the precise data on age is not available, this
study uses the total number of visits by ILO monitors since 2001, which is a
reasonable proxy given that ILO monitors have visited all the exporting
factories at a regular interval.
Third, ﬁrms may need to have a certain level of ﬁnancial capacity to
improve compliance performance (Winter & May, 2001). As the direct
measure of ﬁnancial capacity is difﬁcult to obtain, the survey asked whether
the factory provides Free-on-Board (FOB) services or Cut, Make, and Trim
(CMT) only. FOB is a full-package service, responsible for purchase of
fabric and accessories, production, and transport until loading merchandises
onto the export carrier. CMT literally refers to the production process only.
The distinction between the two types of services is important because
sourcing of fabric and ﬁnancing import and export costs require substantial
resources and managerial know-how unlike CMT (USAID 2007). Hence, a
dummy variable for FOB is used as a measure of ﬁnancial capacity.
Financial and managerial capacity of factory can also be affected by ﬁrm
network, which includes parent companies and other branches (Erickson &
Jacoby, 2003). They can provide access to capital, managerial know-how
and best practices. Independent ﬁrms deprived of such access are likely to
have lower capacity than networked ﬁrms. The questionnaire asked whether
the factory is independent, subsidiary of a group and/or one of multiple
branches in Cambodia. Thus, the dummy variable of independent ﬁrm is
used to measure the absence of ﬁrm network.
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics and inter-correlations of all the
variables under investigation. A cursory examination shows statistically
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix of Dependent, Independent, and Control Variables.
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Non-compliance 17.80 9.67
Visit frequency 1.62 1.16 0.18
Warning 0.45 0.50 0.02 0.04
Duration 3.07 1.60 0.08 0.31 0.07
Agents 0.31 0.46 0.39 0.00 0.02 0.01
Share knowledge 0.32 0.47 0.14 0.01 0.35 0.03 0.08
Production system 0.25 0.44 0.24 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.09 0.29
Encourage training 0.30 0.43 0.20 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.12 0.14 0.05
MSI buyer 0.44 0.50 0.36 0.26 0.23 0.04 0.34 0.04 0.06 0.53
Factory size 7.01 0.70 0.38 0.14 0.08 0.02 0.22 0.31 0.14 0.40 0.61
Factory age 5.94 2.40 0.01 0.10 0.18 0.21 0.16 -0.19 0.04 0.13 0.17 0.18
FOB 0.82 0.40 0.17 0.01 0.05 0.14 0.21 0.12 0.29 0.24 0.31 0.25 0.05
Independent 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.01 0.05 0.14 0.32 0.09 0.17 0.04 0.20 0.23 0.15 0.39
po 0.05, po0.01.
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signiﬁcant relationships between supplier non-compliance and agent,
MSI-buyer, and factory size variables, which need to be further evaluated
by multi-variate regressions.
Model Speciﬁcation
Given the small sample size, simultaneously incorporating all the indepe-
ndent and control variables as well as interaction terms depletes degrees
of freedom. To circumvent this problem, regression analysis is conducted
in two steps. First, baseline OLS regressions are run for each category of
independent variables, including MSI buyer and its interaction terms.
Second, an OLS regression is run with those signiﬁcant predictors identiﬁed
in the baseline regressions, together with control variables.
The baseline regression for deterrence:
Non-compliance ¼ aþb1  visit frequencyþb2 warningþb3 MSI buyerþb4
frequency MSI buyerþb5 warning MSI buyerþe
The baseline regression for relationship:
Non-compliance ¼ aþb1  duration of relationshipþb2  agentsþb3 MSI
buyerþb4 duration MSI buyerþb5  agents MSI buyerþe
The baseline regression for learning:
Non-compliance ¼ aþb1  share knowledgeþb2  production systemþb3
 encourage trainingþb4 MSI buyerþb5  knowledge MSI
buyerþb6  system MSI buyerþb7  training MSI buyerþe
The main regression with added control variables:
Non-compliance ¼ aþb1  signiﬁcant deterrence variableþb2  signiﬁcant
relationship variableþb3  signiﬁcant learning variableþb4 MSI
buyerþb5  factory sizeþb6  factory ageþb7 FOBþb8  independentþe
RESULTS
Baseline Regressions
Table 4 shows the result for the deterrence model. Neither visit frequency
nor warning is signiﬁcantly associated with non-compliance although they
both have negative signs as expected. The presence of MSI buyers is
statistically signiﬁcant in Model 1, and it reduces non-compliance by seven
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items (po0.05). This suggests that reputation-conscious buyers inﬂuence
supplier compliance through a channel other than deterrence. When inter-
action terms are introduced in Model 2, none reaches statistical signiﬁcance.
Visit frequency by non-MSI buyers is negatively associated with non-
compliance, and in the presence of MSI buyers, this negative effect is
reinforced. Warnings by non-MSI buyers are negatively associated with
non-compliance although this negative effect is reduced when MSI buyers
are present. In sum, even though the direction of effects is broadly in
line with the stated hypotheses, none of the deterrence hypotheses are
statistically signiﬁcant in the estimation results.
Table 5 shows the relationship model results, in which transaction
through agents increases non-compliance by 5.7 items (po0.05) in Model 3.
Table 4. Deterrence Model Results.
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Visit frequency 0.91 (1.15) 1.07 (1.72)
Warning 2.41 (2.67) 3.13 (3.56)
MSI buyer 7.01 (2.78) 5.07 (5.45)
Visit frequencyMSI buyer 1.47 (2.40)
WarningMSI buyer 0.95 (5.69)
Constant 23.45 (2.75) 22.74 (3.27)
Observation 50 50
R-squared 0.16 0.16
F-value 2.84 1.73
Note: Standard errors are in the parentheses.
po 0.10, po 0.05, po0.01, po0.001.
Table 5. Relationship Model Results.
Variable Model 3 Model 4
Duration of relationship 0.41 (0.76) 0.72 (0.81)
Agents 5.71 (2.82) 9.75 (3.01)
MSI buyer 5.56 (2.63) 1.08 (2.98)
DurationMSI buyer 1.51 (0.79)
AgentsMSI buyer 8.36 (5.64)
Constant 17.44 (3.21) 13.72 (3.07)
Observation 51 49
R-squared 0.22 0.36
F-value 4.57 4.87
Note: Standard errors are in the parentheses.
po 0.10, po 0.05, po0.01, po0.001.
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The presence of MSI buyers is equally signiﬁcant though in the opposite
direction, reducing non-compliance by 5.6 items. The duration of relation-
ship is not signiﬁcant and positively associated with non-compliance. Once
the variable is interacted with MSI-buyer, however, it gains signiﬁcance and
reduces non-compliance as shown in Model 4.10 In contrast, the duration of
the relationship with a non-MSI buyer is not signiﬁcant and positively
related to non-compliance. This suggests that the duration of relationship
helps reduce non-compliance only when the most important buyer is an MSI
buyer, rejecting the general hypothesis of long-term relationships and
conﬁrming the interaction hypothesis with reputation-conscious buyers.
In Model 4, variable ‘‘Agents’’ measures the effect of agents in the
absence of MSI buyers, and it is highly signiﬁcant, increasing the number of
non-compliance by 9.8 items (po0.01). This is because the agent effect for
an MSI buyer has been separated by adding an interaction variable
(AgentsMSI buyer), which has quite a different though non-signiﬁcant
effect, increasing non-compliance by only 1.4 items.11 It is interesting to note
that the signiﬁcance of MSI buyer is lost once the interaction terms are
included. The ﬁndings generally support the market-based relationship
hypothesis that transaction through agents is associated with a higher level
of non-compliance. The effect of reputation-conscious buyers is partially
mediated by the agent variable, but it also appears to interact with agents,
implying the particularities of reputation-conscious buyers.
In the learning model in Table 6, none of the independent variables
except MSI buyer are signiﬁcantly associated with non-compliance. Buyers
Table 6. Learning Model Results.
Variable Model 5 Model 6
Share knowledge 1.65 (2.96) 3.81 (4.56)
Production system 4.51 (3.20) 3.76 (4.82)
Encourage training 0.19 (3.25) 3.19 (6.00)
MSI buyer 6.44 (3.05) 6.09 (4.25)
KnowledgeMSI buyer 3.58 (6.20)
SystemMSI buyer 1.20 (6.66)
TrainingMSI buyer 4.72 (7.25)
Constant 22.17 (1.97) 22.27 (2.18)
Observation 51 51
R-squared 0.18 0.19
F-value 2.55 1.47
Standard errors are in the parentheses.
po 0.10, po 0.05, po0.01, po0.001.
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knowledge sharing and involvement in determining production systems have
expected negative signs while encouraging training has a positive sign,
possibly due to a high correlation with MSI buyer (i.e., 0.53). Running
separate regressions for each independent variable renders none of them
signiﬁcant. None of the interaction terms are signiﬁcant, suggesting that
reputation-conscious buyers do not condition the effect of learning variables
on non-compliance. Overall, the learning hypotheses are not supported by
the estimation results.
Main Regressions with Added Controls
Table 7 reports the results of main OLS regressions with the variables found
signiﬁcant in the baseline regressions (i.e., relationship and reputation-
conscious buyer variables) and control variables. Model 7 includes all the
variables, whereas Model 8 displays only the signiﬁcant variables without
interaction terms, which is more parsimonious. It shows that about one-
quarter of the variation in non-compliance is explained by only two
variables: transaction through agents and the size of the factory.
The most consistent and signiﬁcant predictor of non-compliance
turns out to be the agent variable. Model 7 shows the conditional effect
Table 7. Main Regression Results with Signiﬁcant Variables and Added
Controls.
Variable Model 7 Model 8
Duration of relationship 0.52 (0.83)
Agents 10.09 (3.24) 6.54 (2.66)
MSI buyer 3.32 (3.31)
DurationMSI buyer 1.33 (0.79)
AgentsMSI buyer 7.92 (5.73)
Factory size 4.37 (2.16) 4.28 (1.80)
Factory age 0.73 (0.55)
FOB 0.34 (3.14)
Independent 1.28 (3.23)
Constant 39.34 (14.96) 45.85 (12.94)
Observation 49 52
R-squared 0.44 0.24
F-value 3.43 7.74
Standard errors are in the parentheses.
po 0.10, po 0.05, po0.01, po0.001.
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of agents: transacting through agents when MSI buyers are not present
increases non-compliance by 10 items (po0.01). Model 8 shows the general
effect of agents: when a supplier transacts through agents, regardless of the
presence of MSI buyers, non-compliance increases by 6.5 items (po0.05).
The duration of the relationship with an MSI buyer is negatively related
with non-compliance and slightly signiﬁcant (po0.1), suggesting that MSI
buyers may be qualitatively different from other buyers in their approach to
buyer–supplier relationships.
As for control variables, the size of the factory is the only signiﬁcant one.
Larger factories tend to have fewer non-compliance items as expected (e.g.,
a 1 percent increase in the number of employees reduces non-compliance by
4.3 items). The signiﬁcance of MSI buyers is lost once agents and factory
size are included. Other ﬁrm characteristics such as age, FOB, independence
are not signiﬁcant.
Interpretation of Results
The above ﬁndings lend support to the relationship hypothesis that
the nature of buyer–supplier relationships importantly affects supplier
compliance performance. Speciﬁcally, market-based transactions through
sourcing agents are consistently associated with poorer compliance per-
formance across different speciﬁcations. This negative agent effect is
augmented in the absence of reputation-conscious buyers. The signiﬁcant
effect of MSI buyers is likely to be mediated through their preference for
close and established relationships with suppliers as very few MSI buyers
use agents (i.e., only 3 of 49 suppliers in the sample produce for at least one
MSI buyer and use agents).
On the contrary, the duration of the relationship is found to reduce non-
compliance only with an MSI buyer. This conditional effect also attests to
the particularity of MSI buyers. Although a long-term relationship may be a
necessary condition for fostering trust and developing collaboration, it is
unlikely to be a sufﬁcient one, which explains the variable’s non-signiﬁcance
in the main regression. With a better measure, the collaboration hypothesis
is likely to be supported.12 In summary, it is likely that the absence of agents
and the presence of collaboration underlie the negative and signiﬁcant
association between reputation-conscious buyers and supplier non-compli-
ance found in Oka (2010).
Although the learning hypotheses are not supported by the evidence, this
channel should be further explored with a larger sample and different
measures of learning. As the type of relationship is likely to affect the degree
of learning between buyers and suppliers, a structural model may be used.
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As for deterrence, there is little evidence to support the deterrence hypotheses,
which may suggest that a policing approach through intensive monitoring
and credible threats may not be the most effective strategy to improve
supplier compliance. Nevertheless, the measures of deterrence may suffer
from endogeneity, and therefore, the result is more tentative than conclusive.
On the basis of these ﬁndings, Fig. 1 depicts a model of buyer inﬂuence
on supplier compliance-performance. Given the need to maintain high
standards, which require a higher degree of asset speciﬁcity, reputation-
conscious buyers normally opt for direct relationships with vendors and
factories. Theses buyers tend to form collaborative relationships and invest
their time and resources in suppliers, encouraging supplier commitment. In
contrast, other buyers, especially cost-conscious ones who specialize in more
standardized products prefer market-based transactions through agents for
efﬁciency reasons. However, market-based transactions encourage neither
buyers nor suppliers to invest in their relationships. Buyers and suppliers in
market-based relationships are likely to have shorter time horizons than
their counterparts in collaborative relationships. Consequently, the former
is less motivated to make asset-speciﬁc investment and commitment, which
negatively affects supplier compliance-performance. Supplier compliance is
also affected by the size of the factory; larger factories tend to have better
compliance levels than smaller ones, given their economies of scale and
higher opportunity/monitoring costs.
CONCLUSION
The rise of non-state regulation of labor standards has provoked heated
debates about whether and how one can design and implement effective
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Fig. 1. Model of Buyer Inﬂuence on Supplier Compliance-Performance.
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non-state regulatory schemes. Although much has been studied and debated
about CoC and monitoring procedures, how buyers inﬂuence working
conditions in their supply chains remains poorly understood. In particular,
a quantitative investigation into different channels of buyer inﬂuence has
been lacking. This paper has attempted to ﬁll the gap by examining different
channels (i.e., deterrence, relationship, and learning) through which buyers
inﬂuence supplier compliance performance. Also, this study has sought
to assess how reputation-conscious buyers may affect those channels
differently and affect supplier compliance-performance. To accomplish
theses tasks, this study has beneﬁted from the data and logistical support
provided by the ILO monitoring program in Cambodia, BFC.
On the basis of the monitoring and survey data from the Cambodian
garment factories, this paper has shown that the main channel linking
buyers and supplier compliance-performance is the nature of their
relationships. Suppliers who transact principally through agents system-
atically have a larger number of non-compliance items than suppliers who
do not depend on agents. In other words, market-based relationships are
associated with poorer compliance performance. On the contrary, deter-
rence and learning variables generally have expected signs but do not reach
signiﬁcance.
The ﬁndings have important practical implications. The results indicate
that market-based relationships through agents may be part of the problem
rather than a solution from the viewpoint of improving working conditions.
Market-based relationships characterized by short-term horizons motivate
neither buyers nor suppliers to invest their time and resources to understand
the root causes of poor working conditions and to commit to continuous
improvement. Rather, market-based relationships prompt suppliers to pass
compliance audits with minimum efforts. Indeed, the non-signiﬁcance of the
deterrence variables suggests that a policing approach based on intensive
monitoring and credible threats may not be the best way to bring
about progress in supplier compliance. These, together, point to the limit
of arm’s-length, compliance-oriented relationships, which could breed
mistrust and dishonesty.
Conversely, the ﬁndings signal the need to develop collaborative
relationships marked by open dialogue, trust, and commitment, which help
foster an environment supportive of continuous improvement. Close and
open relationships with buyers enable suppliers to discuss problems and ﬁnd
solutions rather than to hide them from buyers. To improve supplier
working conditions, therefore, buyers need to place more importance on
the quality of their relationships with suppliers – openness, trust, mutual
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commitment – and not just on the traditional concerns of price, quality and
delivery of goods. These points are echoed by other scholars (Jiang, 2009;
Locke & Romis, 2006; Locke et al., 2007a).
Such collaborative relationships may well underlie the signiﬁcant and
positive effect of reputation-conscious buyers on supplier compliance-
performance. Given the high degree of asset speciﬁcity required, reputation-
conscious buyers tend to avoid market-based relationships and to
form collaborative relationships with their suppliers. In fact, the duration
of the relationship has a positive effect on compliance performance
only with a reputation-conscious buyer. In contrast, more cost-conscious
buyers retailing highly standardized products tend to prefer market-based
relationships which do not require asset speciﬁc investment. This sug-
gests that attracting reputation-conscious buyers could bring important
beneﬁts not only in terms of upgrading products and processes but also
in terms of forming collaborative relationships and improving working
conditions.
Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the negative effects buyers –
including reputation-conscious ones – can have on working conditions in
supply chains. In fact, purchasing practices of buyers sometimes contradict
with the goal of improving working conditions (CCC, 2009; Oxfam, 2004).
In recent years, intense competition and rising prices have squeezed garment
producer proﬁts, making it difﬁcult to invest in better working conditions
or raise wages. On the contrary, buyers are increasingly demanding
quicker delivery, which disrupts work schedules and increases overtime.
Moreover, signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations in orders leave workers idol during low
seasons, making it costly for factories. These buying practices have negative
consequences on suppliers’ capacity to improve working conditions, and
thus need to be addressed.
This research has several limitations. First, the sample size is small
although the sample is broadly representative of the population. Second,
the deterrence variables potentially suffer from endogeneity, which needs
to be better controlled in the future work. Third, although interactions and
mediation between reputation-conscious buyers and other independent
variables have been considered, relationships among the latter have not been
taken into account, which may require simultaneous equation modeling.
Considering these limitations, this paper does not claim to have offered
exhaustive hypothesis testing. Rather, it has provided support to the existing
studies and some additional insights into buyer inﬂuence on their supplier
compliance-performance. Future research could address these points and to
expand upon the inner-workings of the relationship channel.
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NOTES
1. For more information about the ILO monitoring program in Cambodia, see
the website: http://www.betterfactories.org/
2. The ILO monitoring program has been mostly ﬁnanced by international
donors, namely the US Department of Labor (USDOL), USAID, the Agence Franc-
aise de De´veloppement (AFD), the World Bank, as well as by the Cambodian
Government, the Garment Manufacturers Association of Cambodia (GMAC) and
international buyers. As the program seeks to be self-sustaining beyond 2010, the
ﬁnancing scheme is set to change.
3. In fact, as one survey respondent was responsible for four branches, the actual
survey size is 54. Although the survey response is identical for the four branches,
their factory characteristics and compliance data vary.
4. A link to the web-based questionnaire was sent by email to 147 managers, of
which 31 returned as delivery failures, and of which 18 responded (i.e. the response
rate of 15.5 percent). Given the fast turnover of managers in the industry and the
lack of internet use in some factories, the likelihood of ‘‘deliberate refusal’’ is likely to
be less than what the ﬁgure indicates. The response rate for collection through
monitors is not available as the number of questionnaires distributed by monitors
is not known. The response rate for the monitor channel is likely to be higher than
the web-based one, but much lower than that of interviews.
5. For explanation of each variable, please refer to the following section on
measures and descriptive statistics.
6. OSH and welfare are grouped together as the latter is mainly concerned with
health issues such as drinking water and toilets.
7. The result based on the un-weighed composite is not substantially different
from the output using the re-weighed composite, but the latter is more robust.
8. Nonetheless, only 10 percent of them responded non-compliance has actually
led to a cancellation of orders. This is because most suppliers rectify problems within
a given time frame as demanded by buyers. Only when the problem is severe and
recurrent do buyers terminate contracts.
9. The FLA, an American initiative, is the oldest and the best known brand-
oriented MSI in labor regulation. Member companies are required to implement the
FLA code of conduct, submit to un-announced monitoring by accredited auditors,
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and to commit to remediation and public reporting. Currently, 26 companies are
participating, most of which are well-known apparel and sportswear brands as well
as university afﬁliates. The ETI, a UK scheme, is geared toward learning and self-
reporting rather than monitoring. The ETI encourages its member companies to
implement its base code in their supply chains and require them to submit annual
progress report on their code implementation. If progress is deemed unsatisfactory,
members may be asked to resign. Currently, 50 companies are participating, most of
which are large European brands and retailers.
10. The coefﬁcient of the interaction term (durationMSI buyer) measures the
difference in the slopes for MSI and non-MSI buyers while the coefﬁcient of ‘‘duration
of relationship’’ measures the slope for non-MSI buyers. Therefore, the effect of an
extra year of relationship (i.e., 2 years in this case) with an MSI buyer on non-
compliance is the sum of coefﬁcients for non-MSI andMSI buyers: 0.72–1.51 ¼ 0.79.
11. The coefﬁcient of the interaction term (agentsMSI buyer) measures the
difference in the slopes for MSI and non-MSI buyers, whereas the coefﬁcient of
‘‘Agents’’ measures the slope for non-MSI buyers. Therefore, the coefﬁcient for the
use of agents in the presence of MSI buyers is the sum of coefﬁcients for non-MSI
and MSI buyers: 9.75–8.36 ¼ 1.39.
12. Jiang (2009) succeeded in showing the statistical link between such norm-
based relationships and compliance, whereas he failed to show a signiﬁcant link
between market-based relationships and compliance.
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